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更加一致的工具，无疑会对企业避税形成一定的影响：部分学者如 Gupta and 
Swenson（2003）、Phillips（2003）、吕伟和李明辉（2012），认为增加企业管理层
的股权激励可以促进管理者采取更多措施减少企业税负；但也有学者持不同的观














































































Relationship between managers’ behavior and corporate tax avoidance has been 
the focus of theoretical and empirical research. Existing studies have shown that with 
the continuous improvement and development of the modern enterprise system, 
conflict of interest between the owners and managers caused by agency relationship 
under separation of ownership and management rights is an important factor affecting 
corporate tax avoidance. And management options as a tool of making the interests of 
managers and owners more consistent tool will undoubtedly be a certain influence on 
corporate tax avoidance: Some scholars, such as Gupta and Swenson (2003), Phillips 
(2003), Lu Wei and Li Minghui (2012), think the increase of corporate managers 
options can motivate managers to take more measures to promote the reduction of 
corporate tax; but some scholars hold different views, such as Armstrong et al (2009), 
that the increase of managers options does not encourage managers to avoid tax and 
affect the company's effective tax rate. 
Based on existing literature, this paper firstly constructed an econometric model 
to examine the equity incentive management and tax avoidance on financing 
decisions with the overall data from China's listed companies. Secondly, because the 
proportion of state-owned holding company that is relatively large， taking the 
ownership structure of listed companies in China that is estimated virtual variable into 
account, the model examine the management equity incentive impact on corporate tax 
evasion exists in nature under different ownership significantly differences. After 
empirical study, there is a significant relationship between management equity 
incentive and inter-enterprise tax，namely more management equity incentive will 
lead to more avoidance measures. Management equity incentive have different impact 
on corporate tax avoidance in the different nature of property rights, namely the 
management of non-state-owned enterprises relatively have a greater incentive to tax 
avoidance. The full text consists of four parts: 
The first part is the first chapter. It introduces the research background , 















The second part is the second chapter. It mainly introduces theoretical analysis 
and research hypothesis ，concluding the concept of defining tax avoidance, the 
relationship of the equity incentive management and tax avoidance, and whether there 
is difference in different nature of this property. Then it introduces the research 
hypothesis. 
The third part, including the third and fourth chapter, introduces the relevant 
variables involved in the model and using financial data of listed companies in the 
regression to analyze the effect relationship between management equity incentive 
and corporate tax avoidance, as well as the nature of the relationship property whether 
there are significant differences.  
The fourth part is the fifth chapter. It introduces conclusions and implications on 
the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, puts forward reasonable 
policy proposals and notes the research prospects of this article. 
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第 1 章绪论 
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约占 GDP 的 40%（Athens，1997）；意大利 15%的经济活动无法被有效征税（Rome，
1997）；
②




问题亦十分严重。虽然近几年我国的税收收入不断增长，2004 年达到 25 718 亿
元，增收 5 256 亿元，2005 年达到 30 866 亿元，增收 5 148 亿元，但我国仍
存在着巨大的税收流失。
④
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20 世纪 70 年代，美国为解决企业委托—代理机制下所有者和管理者的利益
冲突和矛盾，首先实施了股权激励计划。根据美国证券交易委员会的调查发现，
20 世纪 80 年代以来，美国上市公司高层管理者的长期激励报酬，尤其是管理层
股权激励得到很大的发展，到 2000 年美国上市公司高管薪酬的 60%属于股权激
励。随着企业对管理人才的需求增加，欧洲各国的企业也逐渐开始采用股权激励。





Agrawal and Knober （1996）选取福布斯 500 强中 383 家大型企业的数据为样
本，发现管理者股权激励对企业价值都有负向作用，但不显著，也可以认为二者
不相关。Palia et al.（2001)运用面板数据和工具变量，发现管理层持股水平













通过分析 1980 年《财富》杂志上美国 500 强企业的 371 家上市公司的截面数据，
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Ghosh and Sirmans（2003）通过对 1999 年美国不动产投资信托公司的截面数据
进行实证分析，认为管理层股权激励与公司价值存在负向相关关系，显著性水平
为 10%。 Holderness、Kroszner and Sheehan （1999）认为管理层持股与企业
规模和企业业绩的变化呈负相关关系。 
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